News and Events

Conference

Call for Applications:

Perception is our central interface with the world. But what exactly does this claim entail? There is widespread agreement among philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists that we, as perceivers, are not mere passive recipients of raw sense-data. Perception is instead understood as an active process, insofar as acts of perceiving are characteristically imbued with interpretative activity: the world as perceived variously implies our rational capacities. On this view, perception is not the process of taking the world in, but of making sense of it. This continuous process of perceptual understanding is grounded in our doxastic, linguistic, and agentive capacities as much as in our sensory faculties.

Questions motivating the conference include the following: What are the perceptual grounds that justify beliefs? Is such justification internal to the perceiver or an external fact about the environment? What is the role of looks, seemings and appearances in perception? How is the relation between the contents of perceptions and those of beliefs to be construed? What are the norms governing the complex activity of perception? Are such norms universally valid or invariable, or are they in some sense contingent? And what are the immediate and far-reaching implications of this understanding of perception for the philosophy of mind, knowledge, and action?

This conference aims to address these questions. Topics we wish to explore include, but are not

limited to:

— the phenomenal character and intentional structure of perception;

— accounts of (non)propositional content of perception;

— perceptual confidence and formal-epistemological modeling of perception;

— perception of modal, axiological, moral, and other higher-order properties;

— the distinction between sensory and cognitive phenomenology;

— accounts of perception in the phenomenological tradition.

We invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words by January 31, 2026 ↗here.

We will notify the authors of accepted papers by February 15, 2026.

Please include a separate file with your name, email address, the title of your talk, and your affiliation (if any) and put ‘Reason in Perception Graz 2026’ in the subject line.

‍

This conference will take place at the University of Graz from 7-8 May 2026. Confirmed speakers are Fiona Macpherson, Michelle Montague, John Morrison, Søren Overgaard, Galen Strawson.

If you have any conference-related questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch with Denis Džanić and Daniel Neumann.

May 7, 2026

Reason in Perception

Conference

Call for Applications:

Perception is our central interface with the world. But what exactly does this claim entail? There is widespread agreement among philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists that we, as perceivers, are not mere passive recipients of raw sense-data. Perception is instead understood as an active process, insofar as acts of perceiving are characteristically imbued with interpretative activity: the world as perceived variously implies our rational capacities. On this view, perception is not the process of taking the world in, but of making sense of it. This continuous process of perceptual understanding is grounded in our doxastic, linguistic, and agentive capacities as much as in our sensory faculties.

Questions motivating the conference include the following: What are the perceptual grounds that justify beliefs? Is such justification internal to the perceiver or an external fact about the environment? What is the role of looks, seemings and appearances in perception? How is the relation between the contents of perceptions and those of beliefs to be construed? What are the norms governing the complex activity of perception? Are such norms universally valid or invariable, or are they in some sense contingent? And what are the immediate and far-reaching implications of this understanding of perception for the philosophy of mind, knowledge, and action?

This conference aims to address these questions. Topics we wish to explore include, but are not

limited to:

— the phenomenal character and intentional structure of perception;

— accounts of (non)propositional content of perception;

— perceptual confidence and formal-epistemological modeling of perception;

— perception of modal, axiological, moral, and other higher-order properties;

— the distinction between sensory and cognitive phenomenology;

— accounts of perception in the phenomenological tradition.

We invite you to submit an anonymized abstract of up to 500 words by January 31, 2026 ↗here.

We will notify the authors of accepted papers by February 15, 2026.

Please include a separate file with your name, email address, the title of your talk, and your affiliation (if any) and put ‘Reason in Perception Graz 2026’ in the subject line.

‍

This conference will take place at the University of Graz from 7-8 May 2026. Confirmed speakers are Fiona Macpherson, Michelle Montague, John Morrison, Søren Overgaard, Galen Strawson.

If you have any conference-related questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch with Denis Džanić and Daniel Neumann.

One Day Workshop

Bryan Pickel, University of Glasgow (joint work with Derek Ball, University of St Andrews):
"Immanent Interpretation”

Abstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all, or a substantial fragment, of language is indeterminate in meaning. According to these arguments, if a speaker uses a sentence to express a proposition in a context, then an interpreter must (in principle at least) have more evidence favouring this proposition as the correct interpretation rather than rival interpretations. These arguments appeal to the claim that the interpreter or audience does not have sufficient evidence favouring one interpretation over its rivals. We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users. But, our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments. We construct a research strategy—immanent interpretation—for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments. We conclude by discussing important limitations on immanent interpretation.

Emelia Stanley, University of Vienna:
‍"Formalising Open Texture"

Abstract: Waismann’s (1947) notion of open texture captures a species of (non‐sorietal) semantic‐ and truth‐vagueness: that a concept can both apply and disapply to some given case, within a context of application. Noting that open texture resists characterisation in a classical framework, I present an original formalisation the notion. Using this model I then conjecture, contra Waismann, that open‐texture does not only occur in mathematics, but that it plays an indispensable role in characterising its epistemology, and particularly its resolution strategies for crises of non‐trivial disagreement.

Richard Lawrence, University of Vienna:
"Sharp definitions of concepts and the chaos of experience"

Abstract: Frege insists that, for logical purposes, concepts must besharply defined, and this assumption is now deeply embedded in ourcontemporary approaches to semantics. Yet we have lost track of one ofthe background assumptions of classical German philosophy which was partof Frege's reason for that insistence: the idea that experience isinitially an unstructured chaos, on which we must impose structure byactively seeking to grasp concepts in thought. I will argue that thisbackground played an important role in some of Frege's semantic ideas,and that it is worth revisiting as we try to characterize phenomena likevagueness.

Max Kölbel, University of Vienna:
“A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”

Abstract: So-called "felicitous underspecification" seems to be ubiquitous. Nevertheless communication succeeds effortlessly. A number of theorists (e.g. Viebahn, MacFarlane, King and others) have made proposals as to how semanticists should model this phenomenon. Some have proposed new-fangled semantic contents to do justice to the phenomenon. Others have offered pragmatic explanations of communicative success. In this talk, I want to draw attention to a third, more conservative approach that can at least in some cases be employed to explain what is going on.

John MacFarlane, University of California at Berkeley:
TBA

Location: University of Vienna, Room 3A, NIG, Universitätsstr 7, 3rd floor

Program:

10:00–11:15
Bryan Pickel (Glasgow): “Immanent Interpretation”

11:30–12:45
Emelia Stanley (Vienna): “Formalising Open Texture”

Lunch Break

14:15–15:30
Richard Lawrence (Vienna): “Sharp Definitions of Concepts and the Chaos of Experience”

15:45–17:00
Max Kölbel (Vienna): “A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”

17:15–18:30
John MacFarlane: TBA

If you’d like to attend, you’re very welcome to join us on the day — no prior registration is required.

‍

March 5, 2026

Semantic Indecision Workshop

One Day Workshop

Bryan Pickel, University of Glasgow (joint work with Derek Ball, University of St Andrews):
"Immanent Interpretation”

Abstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all, or a substantial fragment, of language is indeterminate in meaning. According to these arguments, if a speaker uses a sentence to express a proposition in a context, then an interpreter must (in principle at least) have more evidence favouring this proposition as the correct interpretation rather than rival interpretations. These arguments appeal to the claim that the interpreter or audience does not have sufficient evidence favouring one interpretation over its rivals. We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users. But, our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments. We construct a research strategy—immanent interpretation—for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments. We conclude by discussing important limitations on immanent interpretation.

Emelia Stanley, University of Vienna:
‍"Formalising Open Texture"

Abstract: Waismann’s (1947) notion of open texture captures a species of (non‐sorietal) semantic‐ and truth‐vagueness: that a concept can both apply and disapply to some given case, within a context of application. Noting that open texture resists characterisation in a classical framework, I present an original formalisation the notion. Using this model I then conjecture, contra Waismann, that open‐texture does not only occur in mathematics, but that it plays an indispensable role in characterising its epistemology, and particularly its resolution strategies for crises of non‐trivial disagreement.

Richard Lawrence, University of Vienna:
"Sharp definitions of concepts and the chaos of experience"

Abstract: Frege insists that, for logical purposes, concepts must besharply defined, and this assumption is now deeply embedded in ourcontemporary approaches to semantics. Yet we have lost track of one ofthe background assumptions of classical German philosophy which was partof Frege's reason for that insistence: the idea that experience isinitially an unstructured chaos, on which we must impose structure byactively seeking to grasp concepts in thought. I will argue that thisbackground played an important role in some of Frege's semantic ideas,and that it is worth revisiting as we try to characterize phenomena likevagueness.

Max Kölbel, University of Vienna:
“A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”

Abstract: So-called "felicitous underspecification" seems to be ubiquitous. Nevertheless communication succeeds effortlessly. A number of theorists (e.g. Viebahn, MacFarlane, King and others) have made proposals as to how semanticists should model this phenomenon. Some have proposed new-fangled semantic contents to do justice to the phenomenon. Others have offered pragmatic explanations of communicative success. In this talk, I want to draw attention to a third, more conservative approach that can at least in some cases be employed to explain what is going on.

John MacFarlane, University of California at Berkeley:
TBA

Location: University of Vienna, Room 3A, NIG, Universitätsstr 7, 3rd floor

Program:

10:00–11:15
Bryan Pickel (Glasgow): “Immanent Interpretation”

11:30–12:45
Emelia Stanley (Vienna): “Formalising Open Texture”

Lunch Break

14:15–15:30
Richard Lawrence (Vienna): “Sharp Definitions of Concepts and the Chaos of Experience”

15:45–17:00
Max Kölbel (Vienna): “A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”

17:15–18:30
John MacFarlane: TBA

If you’d like to attend, you’re very welcome to join us on the day — no prior registration is required.

‍