Views on what philosophy is and how it should be done vary widely. Is philosophy concerned with reality or our concepts used for grasping aspects of reality? Does philosophy use a priori or empirical methods? What is the role of intuitions? Of hypothetical cases? What are philosophers trying to find out? Is philosophy a descriptive or a normative discipline, or both? This workshop brings together a diverse group of philosophers who have tried to answer some of these questions. We are looking forward to illuminating talks and fruitful discussions.
Speakers:
Elijah Chudnoff, University of Miami
Matti Eklund, Uppsala University
Yaokun Fu, University of Vienna
Max Kölbel, University of Vienna
Edouard Machery, University of Pittsburgh
Asya Passinsky, Central European University
Sophie Veigl, University of Vienna
Eric Wallace, University of Vienna
Alice van't Hoff, University of Vienna
Organiser:
Max Kölbel, University of Vienna
This workshop is supported by the PACE and Knowledge in Crisis projects.
Registration and more details: https://philosophywhatandhow.phl.univie.ac.at/
Program
May 7
10:00
Michelle Montague - Presentational Phenomenology and Descriptive Metaphysics
11:00
Valentina Martinis - Against the Content Constraint. Non-Propositional Perception and Propositional Justification
14:00
Daniel Neumann & Denis Džanić - Perception and Modality
15:00
Søren Overgaard - The Presentational Character of Experience
16:30
Tobias Endres- Elastic Perception and Symbolic Normativity: Beyond ‘Reason in Perception’
May 8
10:00
Fiona Macpherson - Naïve Realism and Colour Illusion
11:00
Anders Nes - A Phenomenal and Functional Account of Perceptual Justification
14:00
Paweł Grad - Hinges of Perceptual Justification
15:00
John Morrison - Iconic Memory as a Window into Perceptual Confidence
16:30
Galen Strawson - Real Direct Realism 2: Charles Augustus Strong
Venue: GEWI Room (3rd floor), Mozartgasse 8, 8010 Graz
Organizers: Daniel Neumann & Denis Džanić
This is an in-person event only
This conference will take place at the University of Graz from 7-8 May 2026.
Venue: GEWI Room (3rd floor), Mozartgasse 8, 8010 Graz
Organizers: Daniel Neumann & Denis Džanić
This is an in-person event only
If you have any conference-related questions, don’t hesitate to get in touch with Denis Džanić and Daniel Neumann.
Oft wird behauptet, es gebe ja keine absolute Wahrheit, sondern nur viele verschiedene Standpunkte, keiner besser als der andere. Im heutigen politischen Diskurs scheint diese Devise auch schon breite Anwendung zu finden. “Wahrheit” ist bestenfalls noch der Name einschlägiger Propagandamedien (“Pravda", "Truth Social").
Die Debatte soll versuchen, der Frage mit philosophischen Mitteln und mit philosophischem Wissen auf den Grund zu gehen.
Der Philosoph Marian David ist ein bekannter Verfechter der Korrespondenztheorie der Wahrheit, der Theorie, die besagt, dass eine Meinung dann wahr ist, wenn sie mit der Realität übereinstimmt. Professor David sieht sich in der Minderheit, wenn er die Frage “Gibt es eine absolute Wahrheit?” mit “ja” beantwortet.
Der Philosoph Max Kölbel, bekannt für seine Arbeiten zum Wahrheitsrelativismus, kann den Kritikern der absoluten Wahrheit zugerechnet werden.
Wer von beiden sich welchem Lager anschließen wird, konnte bis Redaktionsschluss nicht festgestellt werden, da es keine Einigkeit darüber gab, wie die zu debattierende Frage zu interpretieren sei. Wir lassen uns also überraschen!
KiC Debates wird vom Projekt Knowledge in Crisis organisiert, das vom Österreichischen Wissenschaftsfonds (FWF) im Rahmen des Exzellenzcluster-Programms (10.55776/COE3) gefördert wird. Wir sind eine Kooperation der Universität Graz, der Universität Salzburg und der Universität Wien unter der Leitung der Central European University.
↗ Kostenlose Tickets gibt es hier!
Dienstag, Mai 5, 2026, 17:30 – 19:00
Sprecher: Marian David & Max Kölbel
CEU Vienna Campus, Quellenstrasse 51
Raum: Tiered D-001
Was unterscheidet eigentlich Wissen von Unwissen? Oder von Mutmaßung oder Überzeugung? In Zeiten von Fake News, Verschwörungstheorien und AI Halluzinationen sind diese Fragen relevanter denn je. Diese Station beschäftigt sich damit, was Wissen auszeichnet und wie wir es erlangen können.
Wissen ist das, was eine Gesellschaft funktionieren lässt. Ohne Wissen können wir die Umwelt, unsere Städte, das Gesundheitswesen, Regierungen, Bildungssysteme, Wissenschaft, Kultur und alles andere, was uns wichtig ist, nicht bewältigen. Heute stehen wir vor einer Wissenskrise. Unsere Ansprüche, Wissen zu besitzen, werden sowohl durch Technologie als auch durch Politik bedroht. Und die grundlegenden Ideen von Wissen und Wahrheit selbst werden angegriffen.
Im Zentrum dieser Wissenskrise stehen philosophische Probleme über das Verhältnis zwischen Wissen, Wahrheit, Wissenschaft, Ethik und Politik — und letztlich unsere Beziehung zur Realität selbst. Das FWF Exzellenzcluster "Wissen in der Krise" (Knowledge in Crisis) setzt sich mit grundlegenden philosophischen Fragen zum Thema Wissen auseinander.
An dieser Station laden wir Sie dazu ein, gemeinsam mit uns an konkreten Beispielen zu reflektieren, was Wissen auszeichnet und woher unser Wissen kommt.
Convinced you're right? Let's check — philosophy provides a useful toolset for uncovering the truth. At this event, as part of the Lange Nacht der Forschung, you can tackle some of today's most pressing issues through open, honest dialogue with a philosopher. Our "Change My Mind" prompts are here to help you examine your views and see how well they hold up when we think them through together. Come and join in!
Ein Workshop von PhilPublica, dem FWF Exzellenz Cluster „Knowledge in Crisis“ an der Universität Wien und der Central European University.
Ausschreibung
Kann ein autonomes Fahrzeug an einem Unfall schuld sein? Welche Rolle sollen die zukünftigen Generationen in aktuellen politischen Entscheidungen spielen? Ist virtuelle Realität wirklich? In vielen Themen, die derzeit in den Medien diskutiert werden, stecken philosophische Fragen, viele andere würden von einer Berichterstattung mit philosophischem Fundament profitieren. Und auch in der Philosophie selbst werden ständig Konzepte und Begriffe (weiter-)entwickelt, die die Aufmerksamkeit einer größeren Öffentlichkeit verdienen.
Nun gilt die (akademische) Philosophie als schwierig und abstrakt. Doch auch philosophische Themen lassen sich mit ein bisschen Übung zugänglich und spannend präsentieren. Wie das geht, wollen wir in diesem Workshop üben: von der Auswahl der Themen und der Medien über das Planen einer „Story“ bis zum Verfassen eines Textes.
Lina Paulitsch (Der Falter) und Eva Stanzl (Wiener Zeitung) erklären die Basics des journalistischen Handwerkszeugs, analysieren mit Ihnen Beispieltexte aus verschiedenen Medien und begleiten Sie beim Verfassen eines eigenen Kurz-Essays mit philosophischen Gedanken.
Datum: 25.-27. März 2026
Ort: Central European University und Universität Wien
Teilnahmegebühr: 50 Euro.
Bewerben können sich Philosophie-Master-Studierende, in Philosophie Promovierende und alle, deren Philosophie-Master-Abschluss nicht länger als zwei Jahre zurückliegt.
Bewerbungsunterlagen: PDF-Datei 1, in dieser Reihenfolge: a) Zwei Themen-Pitches/Vorschläge für einen Kurz-Essay, b) eine Textprobe (ein Auszug aus einer wissenschaftlichen oder nichtwissenschaftlichen Arbeit von circa einer Seite), beides bitte anonymisiert (also ohne Nennung Ihres Namens), ausgefülltes Formular. PDF-Datei 2: Anschreiben, tabellarischer CV, Abschlusszeugnis(se) oder letzte Notenübersicht bitte per Mail an: workshop@philpublica.de.
Bewerbungsfrist: 4. Januar 2026
Für weitere Informationen, auch zur Bewerbung,
↗ klicken Sie hier
The nature and limits of artificial intelligence (AI) are among the key questions of our time. AI has implications for industry, politics, culture, education, and warfare, among many other things. But what exactly is AI, and what are its limits? AI has a history that is not often examined in the contemporary discourse. And speculations about its limits involve controversial philosophical assumptions. This workshop will bring together philosophers and historians to investigate the foundations of contemporary AI.
Spaces are limited. Please ↗ register here.
Conference speakers:
Tim Crane (CEU): Intelligence as a normative concept
Thomas Haigh (UW-Milwaukee): Artificial intelligence as a brand
Matthew L. Jones (Princeton): Making LLMs: a short history of generative artificial intelligence
and its alternatives
Raphaël Millière (Oxford): Artificial competence
Amira Moeding (Cambridge): "AI is our Alchemy:" On knowledge claims and scientific
standards in the history of AI
Shannon Vallor (Edinburgh): AI and epistemic dispossession
Bryan Pickel, University of Glasgow (joint work with Derek Ball, University of St Andrews):
"Immanent Interpretation”
Abstract: Famous arguments purport to show that all, or a substantial fragment, of language is indeterminate in meaning. According to these arguments, if a speaker uses a sentence to express a proposition in a context, then an interpreter must (in principle at least) have more evidence favouring this proposition as the correct interpretation rather than rival interpretations. These arguments appeal to the claim that the interpreter or audience does not have sufficient evidence favouring one interpretation over its rivals. We show that these arguments fail because they ignore evidence that is available to interpreters – evidence that arises from the interpreters themselves as language users. But, our aim is not merely to rebut indeterminacy arguments. We construct a research strategy—immanent interpretation—for interpreters to meet the concerns of the proponents of indeterminacy arguments. We conclude by discussing important limitations on immanent interpretation.
Emelia Stanley, University of Vienna:
"Formalising Open Texture"
Abstract: Waismann’s (1947) notion of open texture captures a species of (non‐sorietal) semantic‐ and truth‐vagueness: that a concept can both apply and disapply to some given case, within a context of application. Noting that open texture resists characterisation in a classical framework, I present an original formalisation the notion. Using this model I then conjecture, contra Waismann, that open‐texture does not only occur in mathematics, but that it plays an indispensable role in characterising its epistemology, and particularly its resolution strategies for crises of non‐trivial disagreement.
Richard Lawrence, University of Vienna:
"Sharp definitions of concepts and the chaos of experience"
Abstract: Frege insists that, for logical purposes, concepts must besharply defined, and this assumption is now deeply embedded in ourcontemporary approaches to semantics. Yet we have lost track of one ofthe background assumptions of classical German philosophy which was partof Frege's reason for that insistence: the idea that experience isinitially an unstructured chaos, on which we must impose structure byactively seeking to grasp concepts in thought. I will argue that thisbackground played an important role in some of Frege's semantic ideas,and that it is worth revisiting as we try to characterize phenomena likevagueness.
Max Kölbel, University of Vienna:
“A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”
Abstract: So-called "felicitous underspecification" seems to be ubiquitous. Nevertheless communication succeeds effortlessly. A number of theorists (e.g. Viebahn, MacFarlane, King and others) have made proposals as to how semanticists should model this phenomenon. Some have proposed new-fangled semantic contents to do justice to the phenomenon. Others have offered pragmatic explanations of communicative success. In this talk, I want to draw attention to a third, more conservative approach that can at least in some cases be employed to explain what is going on.
Location: University of Vienna, Room 3A, NIG, Universitätsstr 7, 3rd floor
Program:
10:00–11:15
Bryan Pickel (Glasgow): “Immanent Interpretation”
11:30–12:45
Emelia Stanley (Vienna): “Formalising Open Texture”
Lunch Break
14:15–15:30
Richard Lawrence (Vienna): “Sharp Definitions of Concepts and the Chaos of Experience”
15:45–17:00
Max Kölbel (Vienna): “A Conservative Approach to Semantic Indeterminacy”
17:15–18:30
John MacFarlane: TBA
If you’d like to attend, you’re very welcome to join us on the day — no prior registration is required.
Do knowledge and expertise matter in international politics? A provocative question, as it may seem, for the launch of a significant volume that consolidates knowledge studies in International Relations, it also strikes a chord. It feels uncannily pertinent and daunting in the context of epistemic crisis across the sciences, humanities, and the everyday global realities of today. The volume and its editors respond affirmatively, yet shift the emphasis to the role of knowledge and expertise: it is constitutive, while the key remains to embrace the diversity of knowledge-in-use in politics. The Handbook advances this approach by cultivating a collective plural epistemic archive that substantiates a transdisciplinary paradigm in International Relations and, more broadly, in the study of politics. At this book launch, the panelists from the Philosophy and International Relations departments at CEU and from the University of Vienna take up the conversation at a critical moment in how we know the world.
Panel:
Katalin Farkas, Department of Philosophy, CEU & FWF Cluster of Excellence Knowledge in Crisis
Jonathan Knutzen, Department of Philosophy, CEU & FWF Cluster of Excellence Knowledge in Crisis
Katharina Paul (tbc), Department of Political Science, University of Vienna
Erzsebet Strausz, Department of International Relations, CEU
Respondents:
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (co-editor), Aberystwyth University;
Birgit Poopuu (co-editor), Tallin University;
Andrea Warnecke (co-editor), Leiden University
Chair:
Xymena Kurowska (co-editor), Department of International Relations, CEU
When: 16 February 2026
Time: 3.30pm-5pm (small reception afterwards)
Where: CEU Auditorium
You can find out more information about the book here ↗ .
↗ Preview a few chapters of the book, including Introduction and Conclusion.
OpenAI, the creator of ChatGPT, was founded as a non-profit dedicated to ensuring that artificial general intelligence (AGI) would benefit all of humanity. At the time, AGI — the capability of AI to learn, reason and adapt to new situations like a human can — was largely dismissed as science fiction. A decade later and AGI is at the forefront of most discussions about artificial intelligence: some of the largest companies in the world are betting billions on achieving human-level AI.
Philosopher Tim Crane thinks these bets are fundamentally misplaced, arguing that there can be no such thing as AGI (as far as computational AI is concerned). He argues this from reflections on the idea of computation itself. He also argues that even the name itself contains a fundamental flaw — as far as psychology concerned, it is questionable that intelligence is a useful category (let alone 'superintelligence').
Philosopher Simon Rippon remains agnostic on whether we'll ever achieve AGI, but thinks that Tim Crane's reasoning contains fundamental flaws.
What do you think? Join us on 20 January to watch Crane and Rippon debate whether AGI will ever exist, vote for whose arguments you find the most compelling, and share your thoughts, too!